Management, Board and Board of Auditors pay
chairman
The Remuneration Committee, seeking the assistance of a highly specialised provider, analysed the remuneration position of the Chairman, through specific benchmarks with industry sector companies belonging to the FTSE Mib Index, comparable with Snam in terms of size and complexity.
For the comparison with the market, the following Peer Group companies were considered (only companies with a non-executive Chairman): Amplifon, Diasorin, Enel, Eni, Ferrari, Italgas, Leonardo, Pirelli, Prysmian, Saipem, Telecom Italia e Terna.
chief executive officer
The Remuneration Committee, seeking the assistance of a highly specialised provider, analysed the remuneration position of the CEO, through specific benchmarks with industry sector companies belonging to the FTSE Mib Index and European peer companies, utilities and operators of infrastructures in concession, comparable with Snam in terms of size and complexity.
For the comparison with the market, the following Peer Group companies were considered: A2A, Amplifon, Atlantia, Brembo, Campari, CNH Industrial, Diasorin, Enel, Eni, Ferrari, FCA, Italgas, Leonardo, Moncler, Pirelli, Prysmian, Saipem, Telecom Italia, Terna, Centrica, E.On, Enagas, Endesa, ENGIE, Ferrovial, Iberdrola, National Grid, Red Electrica, Naturgy, RWE, Severn Trent, United Utilities, Vinci, Veolia.
The annual variable component (Annual Monetary Incentive Plan - IMA) is calculated with reference to a minimum incentive lever (performance = 85), target level (performance = 100) and a maximum level (performance = 130) respectively equal to 60%, 70% and 91% of the fixed remuneration, in connection with the results achieved by Snam in the previous year compared with the targets defined. A threshold level is set (performance = 85),which corresponds to an incentive level of 60% of the fixed remuneration, below which the short-term incentive is not delivered.
The 2021 targets approved by the Board of Directors are based on:
- EBITDA (30%)
- Investments (20%)
- Strategic projects (10%)
- Adjusted EBITDA and new business milestones (20%)
- Sustainability - injury frequency and severity weighted index of employees and contractors; indices DJSI, FTSE4GOOD, CDP Climate Change and Sustainalytics, Sustainable Finance (20%)
The graph illustrates the overall incentive curve of the 2021 AMI for the Chief Executive Officer.
| Scenarios | Score Total | Payout (% vs target) |
|---|---|---|
| Minimum | 85 | 85% |
| Target | 100 | 100% |
| Maximum | 130 | 130% |
For further details on the Annual Monetary Incentive (AMI) parameters for the CEO please refer to page 23 of the Remuneration Report 2021
In 2019, the Board of Directors resolved the last attribution provided by the 2017-2019 share-based Long-Term Incentive Plan (IALT).
In 2020, a new long-term share-based incentive plan was defined for the next three years. Continuing on from the previous version in place during the previous three years, the 2020-2022 Long Term share-based Incentive Plan (IALT), for managerial positions with a greater impact on company results, involves the annual granting of free shares up to a maximum value for the CEO of 210% of fixed remuneration after three years (vesting period).
The plan is based on four indicators:
- Adjusted net profit, weighting of 50%;
- Added Value, weighting of 30%;
- Reductions in natural gas emissions, weighting of 10%;
- Equal representation in terms of gender diversity in Snam's management team, weighting of 10%.
Total performance is calculated based on the three-year period performance of the parameters identified in the three-year vesting period. The four performance indicators act independently of each other.
At the end of the vesting period there are plans for an additional number of shares to be granted, defined as dividend equivalent, calculated as the value of the dividends not received in relation to the actual number of vested shares. The plan also includes a two-year lock-up period on 20% of the shares.
For further details refer to the website section dedicated to the 2020-2022 Long Term share-based Incentive Plan (LTI).
With regards to the indemnity for the termination of the directorship and executive position of the Chief Executive Officer, it is aligned with the recurring practice in reference markets and as already adopted by Snam in the past. Specifically, if the term of office is not renewed when it expires, or if it is terminated in advance, two years of fixed annual compensation will be payable upon termination of employment plus the average of the Annual Monetary Incentive paid over the last three years, subject to the application of the provisions of the national contract for executives of companies that produce goods and services.
In line with the provisions of national agreements and supplementary company agreements for Snam senior management, the CEO comes under the supplementary pension (FOPDIRE/PREVINDAI), the supplementary healthcare benefits scheme (FISDE) and another health insurance (Generali/Previgen) to supplement the FISDE, life and disability insurance cover, as well as a company car for personal and business use.
MANAGER WITH STRATEGIC RESPONSABILITIES
Considering the Managers with Strategic Responsibilities, the Remuneration Committee, seeking the assistance of a highly specialised provider, analysed the average remuneration levels on the market for positions with similar levels of responsibility and managerial complexity, through specific benchmarks with industry sector companies belonging to the FTSE Mib Index and European peer companies, utilities and operators of infrastructures in concession, comparable with Snam in terms of size and complexity.
For the comparison with the market, the following Peer Group companies were considered: A2A, Amplifon, Brembo, CNH Industrial, Enel, Eni, Ferrari, FCA, Italgas, Saipem, Telecom Italia, Centrica, E.On, Enagas, Endesa, Ferrovial, RWE, Severn Trent, United Utilities.
In 2019, the Board of Directors resolved the last attribution provided by the 2017-2019 share-based Long-Term Incentive Plan (LTI).
In line with the provisions for the CEO, Managers with Strategic Responsibilities are part of the new 2020-2022 Long-Term shared-based Incentive Plan (IALT) for managerial roles which have a great impact on company results. This Plan has the same performance conditions and characteristics as the Plan for the CEO. For Managers with Strategic Responsibilities the incentive assigned is differentiated by the level of the position up to a maximum of 130% of the fixed remuneration.
The number of shares granted at the end of the three-year (vesting) period is calculated in relation to the results achieved.
For further details refer to the website section dedicated to the 2020-2022 Long Term share-based Incentive Plan (LTI).
Managers with Strategic Responsibilities come under the supplementary pension (FOPDIRE/PREVINDAI), the supplementary healthcare benefits scheme (FISDE) and another health insurance (Generali/Previgen) to supplement the FISDE, life and disability insurance cover, as well as a company car for personal and business use.
Non-executive directors
The Remuneration Committee, seeking the assistance of a highly specialised provider, has analysed the remuneration positioning of the Directors, with the support of a specific benchmark with peer companies of the industry sector belonging to the FTSE MIB index, comparable with Snam in terms of size and complexity.
For the comparison with the market, the following Peer Group companies were considered: A2A, Amplifon, Atlantia, Brembo, Campari, CNH Industrial, Diasorin, Enel, Eni, Ferrari, FCA, Italgas, Leonardo, Moncler, Pirelli, Prysmian, Saipem, Telecom Italia, Terna.
The Shareholders’ Meeting of 2 April 2019 approved the remuneration of directors, setting fixed gross annual compensation for the office of € 70,000, plus the refunding of expenses incurred in relation to the position.
Their remuneration is not linked to the financial results achieved by the company nor are they recipients of the share-based incentive plans.
Additional annual compensation is provided for participation in board committees:
- for the Control, Risk and Related Parties Transactions Committee, with regard to the increasingly important role exercised in the oversight of company risks,€ 35,000 for the Chairman and € 25,000 for the other members
- for the Remuneration Committee, the Appointments Committee and the ESG Committee € 25,000 for the Chairman and € 20,000 for the other members.
There are no agreements for severance pay for Non-executive directors or compensation in the event of dismissal or termination of employment without just cause or if their employment is terminated following a takeover bid.
BOARD OF AUDITORS
The compensation of the Remuneration Committee was considered consistent both with respect to a benchmark analysis carried out with reference to industrial companies with a traditional administration and control system belonging to the FTSE Mib index, and in relation to the commitment required by the company to carry out the office.
The Committee reserves the right to carry out a review of the adequacy of the compensation paid to the members of the control body during 2021.
The Shareholders’ Meeting of 2 April 2019 approved the remuneration of the Chairman of the Board of Auditors, setting an annual gross fixed remuneration for the office of 80,000 euros, and that of the other members involves emoluments of 60,000 euros, plus the reimbursement of expenses incurred by virtue of the office. As regards the nature of the office, the following are not provided for: short- or long-term variable incentive components; agreements on severance indemnity and benefits; benefits (apart from the insurance policy to cover professional risks).
03 September 2021 - 13:25 CEST